DOI: 10.5176/2382-5677_PYTT14.13
Authors: Gerald Moshammer
Abstract:
I respond in this paper to theories of moral perception, particularly Wisnewski’s recent groundbreaking ideas, by questioning the prescriptive force of immediate moral sensation and “seeing”. I particularly scrutinize the notion of “heterochthonous perception” and issue doubts whether moral perception could, as Wisnewski claims, be detached from personal interests, intrinsically prescriptive and, at the same time, divergent. I finally highlight different forms of interplay between moral perception and moral beliefs, in order to embed moral perception in a more dynamic ethical framework. Moral philosophy cannot even initiate without vetoing or transforming the alleged immediacy of moral perception. This, I conclude, also has severe consequences for moral realism.
Keywords: moral perception; presciptivity; affordance; emotion
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