Authors: Anthony T. ODOEMENA and Masahide HORITA
Contemporary schemes on Public-Private Partnership (PPP) often involve the participation of both foreign and domestic private investors in the provision of public infrastructure services. The vulnerability of these schemes to host government actions and omissions has given rise to a number of empirical studies on the global determinants of PPP trends. In the light of this vulnerability, the impacts of reward and punishment mechanisms that characterize both bilateral and multilateral investment treaties on reducing the temptation for host-government opportunism have been a subject of great interest. Interestingly, views on the actual impact of these international legal mechanisms on investment location have also been controversial. The aims of this paper are as follows; to examine the applicability of agreements on international investment in Public-Private Partnerships for infrastructure, and to analyze the factors that militate against the benefits thereof, using political economy and game-theoretic perspectives. In view of the increase in the number of international investment disputes that have used various forms of investment agreement as the basis of consent, we conclude that it will be premature to deny the fact that international investment laws have made a significant difference. In addition, we have examined a number of factors that can determine the extent of their efficacy, with particular reference to oversea PPP investment promotion and protection.
Keywords: Government Opportunism, Investment Treaties, Public-Private Partnership