DOI: 10.5176/2251-1938_ORS24

Authors: Eduardo Ramos Méndez and José Antonio Carrillo Ruiz

Abstract:

We present an extension of the stable marriage problem in which we can find the fundamental elements of the basic version of this problem: two sets of agents and their respective lists of preferences. In this extension the two sets of agents, which are called positions and applicants to fit the new model to the scenario in which the problem develops, are partitioned into several subsets, establishing an association between the subsets of every set. Each applicant specifies his preferences in its preference list, including elements of the set of positions, some of which may be vetoed for certain applicants, according to the subset of the partition of the set of positions to which they belong, . The preference lists of positions are designed on the basis of master lists. In this new extension, these lists are called ranking. The main differentiating element with respect to the basic model, if we consider these rankings, is that given two applicants in the same subset, they are subject to two different rankings, not always consistent. The hypothesis made in this paper in relation with the rankings as tool to assign positions to applicants, have leaded to three different models, which have been called JE1, JE2 and JE3. Undoubtedly, the third one allows perceiving more clearly all the features of the double ranking, not always consistent.

Keywords: Stable marriages; algorithm

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